Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Hogs R Us, a Utah corporation, et al. v. Town of
Fairfield : Amicus Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard G. Allen; Larry S. Jenkins; Wood Crapo; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
Joseph C. Rust; Mark H. Richards; Attorneys for Appellants; Paul W. Mortensen; Hanks &
Mortensen; Attorneys for Amicus, Utah Shared Access Alliance.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Hogs R Us v. Town of Fairfield, No. 20070872 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/532

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COUR1

HOGS P. US, a Utah corporation, et a.L
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.

Case No. 20070872

TOWN OF FAIRFIELD,
Defendant/Apnehcu

Subject to reassignment to the Court of
Appeals
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE UTAH SHARED ACCESS ALLIANCE

ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES R. TAYLOR

Richard G, Allen
2975 West Executive Parkway #509
Lehi9 Utah 84043
Larry S. Jenkins
WOOD CRAPO
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Joseph C. Rust
Mark H. Richards
Attorneys for Appellants as listed
on page 1

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Paul W. Mortensen
Hanks & Mortensen, P,C.
8 East Broadway, #746
Salt Lake City, Utah 8^ ' Attorneys
nee

Amwitz

Shared Access

Attorneys for Appellants:
KESLER & RUST
68 South Main Street, Second Horn
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Hogs R Us, Scott C. McLachlan,
Zane Dansie, and Keith Jonsson
Mark H. Richards
BENNETT TUELLER J( )I INSON & DEERE
3165 East Millrock Drive. Suite 5on
Salt Lake City. Utah 84 P i
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants < m.-. <«,,/i\ luij ti,•,>,.- . •

1

•ui Anil i:,<ms, LLC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

STATE OF INTEREST OF AMICUS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

6

I.

A Governing Authority Has A Mandatory Duty to "Keep The Road Open
and In Suitable Repair"

6

A. This Duty Cannot Be Avoided or Exterminated

6

B. The Ministerial Duty to Keep the Road Open and In Suitable Repair Is
Applicable to the Town of Fairfield

7

C. Alleged Practical Problems Do Not Relieve An Authority from
Mandamus

8

II. The Legislature Cannot Restrict Or Extinguish A Governing Authority's
Mandatory Duty to Keep the Road Open and In Suitable Repair

9

A. Utah's Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act Provisions Cannot
Restrict or Extinguish Government Authorities' Mandatory Duty to
Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair

10

B. The ROWAFL Act^Could in an Appropriate Case, Be Reconciled
with the Whitesides Duty

11

CONCLUSION

14

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
CityofSalinav.

Wisden, 737P.2d981 (Utah 1987)

10

Escobedo v. State of California, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P. 2d 1 (1950)

10

Hathaway v. McConkie, 85 Utah 21 at 25, 38 P.2d 300 (1934)

13

Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, Judge, 48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541 (1916)

13

People of the Territory of Utah v. Van Tassel, 13 Utah 9, 43 P. 625 (1896)

13

Richards v. District Court of Weber County, 71 Utah 473, 267 P. 779 (1928)

13

State v. Hart, Judge, 19 Utah 438, 57 P. 415 (1899)

13

State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216 at 219, 429 P.2d 969 (1967)

13

The Chicago Motor Coach Company v. The City of Chicago, 337 111. 200,
69 N. E. 22 (1929)

11

Whitesides v. Green, 44 P.1032, 13 Utah 341 (Utah 1896)

2, passim

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann., § 72-5-103(1)

9

Utah Code Ann., § 72-5-105(3)

7

Utah Code Ann., § 72-5-301, et.seq

9

Utah Code Ann., § 72-5-30l(l)(5)(h)

14

Utah Code Ann., § 72-5-301(5)

14

Utah Code Ann., §72-5-303(1)

13

Utah Code Ann., § 72-5-303(1 )(a)

9

3

Utah Code Ann, § 72-5-303(l)(b)

9, 12

Utah Code Ann, § 72-5-306(2),(3)

12

Utah Code Ann, § 72-6-114(a)

7

Utah Code Ann, § 72-8-809

7

RS (Revised Statute) 2477 ("R.S. 2477 rights-of-way")

9

RULES
U.R.C.P. 65B(d)(2)(B)

13

TREATISES
The Law of Local Government Operations, Charles S. Rhyne, 1980, §16.9

4

10

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS
Utah Shared Access Alliance (^'Amicus"), Utah's largest motorized access
advocacy organization, is a Utah non-profit corporation representing individuals and
organizations having a combined membership of approximately 5,500 members. Amicus
represents individuals and families who rely upon motorized vehicle access for business,
family needs and recreation throughout Utah, including traveling on Utah paved
highways, unimproved roads, and R. S. 2477 rights-of-way across federal lands located in
Utah. Amicus' members use motorized vehicles, including regular passenger vehicles
and trucks, motorcycles, four wheel drive street-legal vehicles, and off highway vehicles
such as ATVs, dirt bikes, snowmobiles and four wheel drive vehicles. Amicus' and
Amicus' members' uses of these vehicles directly depend upon access to Utah's public
highway system, including R. S. 2477 rights-of-way.
Amicus and its members regularly participate in local, state and federal agency
land use planning to protect and preserve motorized access to and on public rights-ofway. Amicus and its members have been parties or amici in numerous state and federal
court actions, administrative appeals, and other actions to preserve motorized access.
The interests of Amicus and its members are directly implicated by this action as
discussed herein.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Utah governmental authorities have a mandatory duty to "keep the road

open and in suitable repair." Therefore, Utah courts may issue writs of mandamus
compelling governmental authorities to keep a public right-of-way open and in suitable
repair. Such relief appears to be warranted in this action.
2.

The legislature has no power to extinguish an authority's mandatory duty to

"keep the road open and in suitable repair." The Court should approach Utah's Rightsof-way Across Federal Lands Act with caution.
ARGUMENT
I.

A Governing Authority Has a Mandatory Duty to "Keep the Road Open
and in Suitable Repair."

The common law and this Court have long recognized that a governing authority
has a mandatory duty to "keep the road open and in suitable repair." Whitesides v.
Green, 44 P. 1032, 1033, 13 Utah 341 (Utah 1896). In Whitesides, decided immediately
after Statehood, the Court stated,
"The right acquired by prescription and use carries with it such width as is
reasonably necessary for the public easement of travel, and where the
public have acquired the easement the land subject to it has passed under
the jurisdiction of the public authorities, for the purpose of keeping the
same in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by the public. Such
authorities are bound to keep the road open and in suitable repair, and, if
obstructions be placed thereon, it is their duty to remove the same, and care
for the rights of the public,
A.

This Duty Cannot Be Avoided or Exterminated.

The duty of a jurisdictional authority to "keep the road open and in suitable repair"
recognized in Whitesides is fundamental. Rulings that authorities have nondelegable

duties to protect the safety of the public exercise due care in maintaining roads within
their boundaries, rest upon this bedrock duty.
B.

The Ministerial Duty to Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair
Is Applicable to the Town of Fairfield.

Amicus understands that the road involved in this case is located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Town of Fairfield ("Fairfield"). Under Whitehead and the
"nondelegable duty" authorities cited in App. Br. at 12-13, Fairfield has a ministerial duty
to keep the involved road open and in suitable repair. Amicus, therefore, agrees with
Appellants that Utah courts have the power of mandamus to enforce this ministerial duty.
Further, the facts in this case, as understood by Amicus, strongly indicate that the road,
considering its specific circumstances, has been historically used by large and small
motorized vehicles, is seriously cratered, is harmful to motorized vehicles attempting to
travel on it, and is dangerous to the public. Assuming such facts, the Court should
appropriately find 1) that the involved road is not open and/or is not in suitable repair,
and 2) that a writ of mandamus should issue.

1

See authorities cited in App. Br. at pages 12-13.

See Point II.A., infra, including Notes 8, 9. Limited temporary restrictions consistent
with the authority's mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable repair include:
1) the reasonable need of a highway authority to temporarily "close or restrict travel on a
highway ... due to construction, maintenance work, or emergency," § 72-6-114(a), Utah
Code; 2) the reasonable temporary closure of roads for national defense purposes, § 768-809, Utah code; and 3) the temporary re-routing of a portion of an R. S. 2477right-ofway for environmental reasons, with an alternative replacement route portion being
essential to keep the road open, § 72-5-105(3). These temporary actions apply uniformly
to all users and modes of transportation.

7

C.

Alleged Practical Problems Do Not Relieve an Authority from
Mandamus.

Amicus realizes that an authority might complain of budgeting or other problems
that might interfere with the authority's immediate ability to suitably repair a road. Such
hypothetical problems, however, may not excuse a court from its duty to mandate an
authority to fulfill its ministerial duty to suitably repair a road that has suffered
"unsuitable" disrepair. Financial or other hypothetical problems, if bona fide, at most
might allow the court to temper or temporarily withhold contempt sanctions upon an
authority's failure to immediately comply with a writ of mandamus. However, in the
meantime, the authority and the public would be on notice that the authority would likely
be liable for injuries and damages to persons and property resulting from the authority's
failure to repair the road, including economic damages. This would provide the authority
with the incentive to address its problem sooner rather than later. Upon utter
unwillingness or inability of an authority to comply with a writ of mandamus, the court
could resort to punitive or creative sanctions. Here, such sanctions could include
requiring Fairfield to accept the funds tendered by Plaintiffs and immediately use such
funds to contract for repair of the road.

Amicus takes no position whether a court may order an authority to enhance its budget
through bonding or taxation. However, here it appears that Fairfield has no financial
excuse to not obey a writ of mandamus since Plaintiffs have offered to pay for the road
repairs.
8

II.

The Legislature Cannot Restrict or Extinguish a Governing Authority's
Mandatory Duty to Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair.

Appellants' brief at page 20-22 argues that, since the legislature has adopted the
Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act (the "ROWAFL act"),4 which declares certain
duties regarding certain R. S. 2477 rights-of-way discretionary, and, has not passed a
similar law regarding the involved road, the legislature must have intended to preserve a
mandatory duty of repair for the involved road.
Amicus urges the Court to avoid this argument as unnecessary based upon Amicus'
argument in Point I or based upon other of Appellant's arguments. The Court should be
careful not to undertake to construe the ROWAFL act where the statute's construction is
not central to this appeal. This is because Appellants' argument misapprehends the

4

Part 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 72, Utah Code, § 72-5-301, et seq.

5

Explicitly: "improvement" of any R. S. 2477highway under § 72-5-303(l)(b). Possibly
by implication: "maintenance" of "a [R.S. 2477] highway [not] included on a highway
system for vehicular travel" under § 72-5-303(l)(a).

6

Revised Statue 2477 (codified as 43 U.S.C. section 932) from the 1866 Mining Act,
states "the right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved
for public uses, is hereby granted." While the grant was repealed in 1976, rights of way
previously created under the statute were "grandfathered."
Section 72-5-103(1), cited by Appellants, states
(a) The state and its political subdivisions are not required to maintain highways
within R. S. 2477 rights-of-way for vehicular travel unless the R. S. 2477 right-ofway encompasses a highway included on a highway system for vehicular travel.
(b) A decision to improve or not improve an R. S. 2477 right-of-way is a purely
discretionary function.

9

power of the legislature. Appellant's brief at page 22 is incorrect when it states, "As
such, a court cannot compel the State through mandamus to maintain any R. S. 2477
right-of-way." That this is an erroneous statement of the law is shown by the following
discussion.
A.

Utah's Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act Provisions Cannot
Restrict or Extinguish Government Authorities' Mandatory Duty to
Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair.

Utah's legislature and political subdivisions have never had the power to
eliminate an authority's mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable repair. The
Court may not in its analysis herein assume that Utah's legislature in the case of R. S.
2477 rights-of-way has lawfully restricted governing authorities' mandatory duty to keep
their rights-of-way open and in suitable repair. When faced with an on-point case
Any suggestion that any legislative body has the power to extinguish the duty
recognized in Whitesides, immediately implicates firmly established mandatory sovereign
duties, and, fundamental rights of the public, including, but not limited to, the right to
travel. This Court has recognized a right to travel under the Utah Constitution, in
addition to the federal right, stating:
"The right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions does not
include the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways.
The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and
efficiency of our public roads. It enhances rather than infringes upon the
right to travel.
City ofSalina v. Wisden, 131 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1987). See also: The Law of Local
Government Operations, Charles S. Rhyne,1980, §16.9: "...a municipality has no power
"to deny a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the
ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in
accordance with the public interest and convenience. Ordinary use is the right of all."
Escobedo v. State of California, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P. 2d 1, 9 (1950), overruled on other
grounds at 499 P.2d 979, 984: "The use of highways for purposes of travel and
transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right..." Also,
Note 9, infra.
10

requiring construction of the ROWAFL act the Court would need to carefully consider
the implications of the inherent duty of a jurisdictional authority to keep the road open
and in suitable repair. To suggest that the legislature has the power to restrict or
extinguish a highway authority's sovereign duty to keep any R. S. 2477 right-of-way
open and in suitable repair is to necessarily suggest that the legislature also has the power
to restrict or extinguish an authority's mandatory duty to keep open and suitably repair
major arteries, residential streets and state highways. The law has never ceded such
chaotic discretion to the state legislature or to political subdivisions.9
B.

The ROWAFL Act Could, in an Appropriate Case, Be Reconciled
with the Whitesides Duty.

Proper analysis of Utah's ROWAFL act in an on-point case, would first attempt to
reconcile the statute to Whitesides, which could, as shown by the following discussion, be
accomplished. Otherwise, inconsistent provisions of the ROWAFL act would need to be
stricken down.
For necessary perspective, it must initially be remembered that Whitesides'
discussion of the common law mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable
repair was specifically in reference to public rights-of-way by prescription, Whitesides,
60 P. at 1033, which is the precise derivation of all rights-of-way originally established
across federal lands under R. S. 2477. That many R. S. 2477 rights-of-way today are
very rough vehicle "trails," when compared to modern improved roads, means only that
Cf. The Chicago Motor Coach Company v. The City of Chicago, 337 111. 200, 169 N. E.
22, 25 (1929): "Even the legislature has no power to deny a citizen the right to travel
upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of business or
pleasure ..."
11

federal law was adopted and in 1896 when Whitesides was decided. That in the more
modem world many roads are graded or paved does not change the analysis of the
responsible jiiidiminh > 1111 s fqjarcliiK« more priimliu1 R J JA > ' rijj.lits-oi»\\a\. '
Most of Utah's ROWAFL act does not implicate the Whitesides duty. Subsection
72-5-303(l)(b), Utah Code, regarding R. S. 24"^rights-of-way, clearly does not affect a
hig>-*

>. • :-. . .. . ;•

...r*ie repair, as such provision

states only that a "decision to improve or not improve an R. S. 2477 right-of-way is a
purely discretionan fmu lion " Improvements in K S. 2-17" roads would include actions
bi

> L\

. ^ f ..:

open and in suiUihic tvpaiK

^*cii db paving.

realigning, etc. Likewise irrelevant, is section 72-5-iUO^ u ; ) • w
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most, withdraws any waiver of sovereign immunit\ inuK !he Utah Governmental
Immunity "let in I itle 63. Chapter 30d, I Jtah Code, for injuries resulting from use of R.
S. 2477 rights-of-way. The withdraw al of waiver of so\ ereign imi ill n lit)

• * >t

eliminate the governing authority's mandatory duty to keep the road open and n suitable

"Suitable repair" should be addressed in the specific iactual context of the nonimproved nature of the specific R. S. 2477 right-of-way. first allowing the authority to
make its determination whether a proposed repair is. or is not, necessary as "suitable
repair" considering the circumstances and history of the particular right-of-way. An
authority's decision that an action was not necessary for "suitable repair" could be upheld
if not arbitrary and capricious under the circumstances of the particular right-of-way and
the specific repair issue. However, an authority's decision that de facto left the right-ofway completely impassible would clearly be arbitrary and capricious under Whitesides.
12

repair any more than the preservation of sovereign immunity for judicial functions could
relieve a court of its mandatory duty to rule on cases within its jurisdiction.l ]
Only in considering maintenance in subsection (a) of section 72-5-303(1) does the
ROWAFL act come near to violating Whitesides. It should first be noted that this
provision does not universally apply to "any R. S. 2477 right-of-way" per App. Br., but
only to a right-of-way that may not be "a highway included on a highway system for
vehicular travel" - whatever that means.

Next it should be noted that subsection (a)

uses the word "maintain," not the words "keep open and in suitable repair" per
Whitesides. If "maintain" concerns routine maintenance above and beyond the
authority's duty "to keep the road open and in suitable repair," then subdivision (a) would
not conflict with Whitesides. However, if "maintain" is considered to include action
necessary "to keep the road open and in suitable repair," then subdivision (a) would
unlawfully violate the Whitesides duty.
The definition of "maintenance" at section 72-5-301(5) may conflict with
Whitesides, depending upon construction. For example, subsection 72-5-30l(l)(5)(h)
"clearing roadway of obstructing debris," unless construed to mean "clearing roadway of
Regarding the duty to rule, see: Richards v. District Court of Weber County, 71 Utah
473 at 478, 267 P. 779 at 781 (1928) cited in State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216 at 219, 429
P.2d 969 at 970-71(1967); Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, Judge, 48 Utah 214 at 221,
159 P. 541 (1916), cited id.; State v. Hart, Judge, 19 Utah 438, 57 P. 415 at 416 (1899)
cited id.; People of the Territory of Utah v. Van Tassel, 13 Utah 9, 43 P. 625 at 626
(1896); Hathaway v. McConkie, 85 Utah 21 at 25, 38 P.2d 300 at 302 (1934). See also
grounds for review under U. R. Civ. P. 65B(d) "(B)... failed to perform an act required
by law as a duty of the office, trust or station ..."
12
Amicus is unaware of any definition of "a highway included on a highway system for
vehicular travel" within the ROWAFL act. Under Whitesides, al] public rights-of-way by
prescription as a result of vehicular use are part of a highway system for vehicular travel.
13
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violate Whitesides. Similarly, the general definition at the beginning of subsection (5),
unless construed to accommodate Whitesides, would also potentially violate Whitesides.

maintenance decisions discretionary, as does subsection (b) regarding "improvements"
decisions, the Court could readily find that the legislature did not intend subsection (a) to

Again, the foregoing is not an invitation for the Court to now construe the
ROWAFL ;u : 'mt precisely the opp^ik
unnecessa-

.

Tin: Court should not slip into dicta that could

. ,-v.,-: , .

:

R

S 2477 rights-of-way and other highways. The fundamental duty in Whitesides, the
navigational star, should not be explicitly or implicitly compromised.
CONCLUSION,
The Court should rule consistently with Whitesides, again recognizing that
authorities have a mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable repair and that
mandamus is an a\ ailable remed>

I he Cot n t shoi ild approach the R Oto' t X I T act \ \ • ith

caution, being careful to not explicitly or implicitly con^romise the Whitesides
fundamental duty applicable to all highways, including a,i R. S. 2477 rights-of-way.

1}

Subsection (5) reads, "'Maintenance' means any physical act of upkeep of a highway
or repair of wear or damage whether from natural or oilu-r causes ..."
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